It is reported that in 2015, MUJI (Muji) set up 30 stores in China, and the 2016 fiscal year is expected to achieve 300 billion yen sales, of which Asia centered overseas market accounts for 1/3.

　　 MUJI There has always been a blind dependence on big stores. In 1993, it opened the first 1190 square meter store in Japan. In 2001, the average noodle area of MUJI products reached 995.9 square meters. As long as the basic requirements were met, the brand would open more than 1000 square meters. This led directly to its first time in 2001. loss Next year, Tokue Junichi served as the executive director of the good plan and was responsible for the development.

Today's Chinese Market It may enable Muji to achieve its previous unfulfilled pursuit. At present, the number of MUJI (Muji) stores in China has risen from the first 1 to 128 at the end of 2014. As far as the big shop is concerned, apart from the super flagship store in Chengdu, it is understood that the flagship store of MUJI Shanghai has indeed been put on the agenda and is being selected. Perhaps soon, the legendary MUJI, the largest flagship store in the world, will land in Shanghai.

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Nowadays, people still like to call the "local tyrants" the rich businessmen in China, with their satire on their tastes, because they used to be so fond of showing off their wealth by flaunting the big LOGO. But after 2012, most of the wealthy in China began to dislike LOGO. "They do not like to represent themselves in LOGO. They prefer a unique and honorable expression." Zhou Ting said.

Miss Kong, like Chanel's brooch and Hermes's printed scarf, sits on the Huaihai Road on the Huaihai Road in Shanghai by a private driver's car. She looks at the window of the LV store outside the window and tells the reporter that she will never use LV's bag again.

In 2015, the new crisis faced by international brands in China was that the Chinese tycoons were going to be branded. In other words, China's rich are beginning to stop consuming traditional luxury brands that they consider to be "popular". "Why pay for the already popular brand premium?" the new rich have no specific demand for consumer brands. These people are the core consumers of luxury goods.

In the first half of 2014, the luxury brand maintained a good growth for many years, which highlighted the weakness. The sales growth of the world's first luxury goods giant LVMH (MOET & CHANDON Hennessy Louis Vuitton group), the Swiss luxury goods company Richemont, and the SWATCH group maintained a small growth rate of about 2%; the net profit growth of the negative growth area increased year by year, the LVMH fell by 5%, the peak group dropped by 4%, the French Open Cloud group dropped 9%, and the SWATCH group maintained a positive growth rate of 1%, only Hermes gained 6% positive growth.

When Chinese rich people decide not to pay the price for the brand premium, and only pay the price for the products, the financial data of the international luxury magnates become "ugly" seems to be the beginning. "When luxury goods are spanferred from brand to product centered, the pricing power of the whole market is the first to change." Zhou Ting believes that this is no doubt a qualitative change: the brand decides "what I sell and what you buy", which has lasted for almost two hundred or three hundred years in the luxury sector and will become the consumer's final rule. This is too scary for traditional luxury brands.

This terrible reason is that, who said that the Chinese liquor industry will not act again in the luxury industry? In 2014, the liquor prices that were once high were frequently frustrated, and the price cut over the whole industry. Losses and performance fell sharply, and the adjustment seemed to be bottomless. Obviously, there are some misery in luxury and liquor.